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1. INTRODUCTION
This essay examines the use of the notion of democracy by
critics of specific dispute outcomes generated by international
trade regimes. The establishment and expansion of the World
Trade Organization ("WTO") and North American Free Trade
Agreement ("NAFTA") have stimulated broader critiques which
question the democratic accountability of these supranational in-
stitutions. These democratic attacks on international trade re-
gimes undercut claims for their legitimacy.' I hope to identify a
middle case between a totalizing view of democracy (which effec-
tively reasserts national sovereignty over all measures) and one
where the international trade regime rides roughshod over all na-
4 Professor of Law, Suffolk University. Lisle Baker, Steve Charnovitz,
Stephen Hicks, Philip Nichols, Arie Reich, Andrea Schneider, Gregory Shaffer
and Joel Trachtman provided helpful criticism. A preliminary version of this
essay was presented at the conference Linkage as Phenomenon: An Interdiscipli-
naty Approach, sponsored by the International Economic Law Interest Group
of the American Society of International Law. I am most grateful for com-
ments from the conference participants and for the research assistance of
Stephanie McMenimen and Veronica White.
Patti Goldman of the Sierra Club Legal Defense Fund has written:
During the recent debates over [NAFTA], the Uruguay Round of the
[GATT], and the extension of fast-track rules to both the NAFTA and
the Uruguay Round, many charged that international trade agreements
clash with democratic principles. This charge rings true. The interna-
tional trade system operates contrary to every principle of democracy
and government accountability imbedded in U.S. domestic policy
making.
Patti Goldman, The Democratization of the Development of United States Trade
Policy, 27 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 631, 633 (1994); see also Robert F. Housman,
Democratizing International Trade Decision-making, 27 CORNELL INT'L L.
699, 702 (1994) ("[Alt a time when the democratic preachings of the developed
world seem to be having their greatest effect on the actions of developing and
transition nations, these same d-eveloped nations are rushing head first into in-
ternational trade agreements that offend the essential principles of democ-
racy.").
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tional impulses. Perhaps screens or filters can be applied to those
cases where democracy objections are raised. These screens will
permit democratic objections to be considered in a discriminating
manner and will incorporate values other than. democratic ones. I
will suggest we use these filters to identify popular national meas-
ures which are: (1) authentic (and, in particular, those which are
idiosyncratic) and (2) self-sacrificing. Use of these tests can permit
democracy to be upheld in an additional, albeit discrete, coterie of
cases. In so doing, one can recreate greater space for national
autonomy without ripping apart the basic structure of the inter-
national trade systems.
1.1. International Trade and Democracy
WTO and NAFTA limit democratic expression by setting
significant new bounds on the permissible range of national deci-
sional autonomy. Like federated states, nations may no longer set
product safety levels, food standards, or air quality targets with-
out taking into account the possibility that such regulation im-
permissibly impedes (or will be judged to impede) the flow of
trade. The construction of the trade regimes reflects a national
loss of control associated with a loss of sovereignty that has seri-
ous democratic implications, particularly for those nations with
strong self-images, such as democracies.
In operation, international trade regimes exert a strong disci-
pline on national law. At times this discipline is affirmative,
obliging nations to enact compliant law even where it has little in-
ternal democratic support.2 For example, the universalization of
the recognition of intellectual property rights has been achieved
through affirmative discipline. Developing countries generally
had opposed recognition of intellectual property rights; owner-
2 TRIPS, for example, imposes the requirement on all WTO members to
conform national patent law to the Paris Convention. See Agreement on
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, Mar-
rakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization [hereinafter
WTO Agreement], Annex 1C, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE
URUGUAY Round vol. 31; 33 I.L.M. 81 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS]. Thus, India
is forced to recognize foreign pharmaceutical patents even though this legisla-
tion is highly unpopular there. Indeed, the United States has recently cited In-
dia for its alleged failure to establish law consistent with TRIPS' requirements.
See India-Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and Agricultural Chemical Prod-
ucts, WTO Doc. WT/DS50/R (Sept. 5, 1997).
3 This is accomplished by "binding" us all in numbers, obligated to the na-
tional goal of establishing intellectual property protections.
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ship of these rights is vested largely in the most developed coun-
tries. The payment of royalties for use of foreign-owned intellec-
tual property rights would cause wealth to flow northward, from
the poor to the rich. As such, there was little democratic appetite
in India or Brazil for establishing these rights. By linking market
access (particularly in the textile and agricultural sectors) to an ac-
ceptance of Western-style intellectual property rights in the Uru-
guay Round negotiations, developing countries committed them-
selves to enact patent, copyright, and trademark schemes.
4
Mandated enactments of national law are relatively unusual fea-
tures in the WTO and NAFTA structures, although they have
played a large role in the European Union ("EU").
The trade regimes are more exposed to democratic criticism
when they challenge or set aside national law. By their terms the
trade regimes assert a kind of supremacy, i.e., inconsistent na-
tional law must give way to these international commitments.
6
The further implication of this structure is that national lawmak-
ers will learn the bounds on their remaining freedom of action
and will prospectively circumscribe legislation that runs counter
to international trade norms. Nations can and do enact measures
that are inconsistent with international trade discipline. Conflicts
between national law and international trade commitments may
be inadvertent, since rulemakers often are not aware of or do not
4 In addition to mandating conformity of national patent law with the
Paris Convention, TRIPS mandates adoption of copyright law conforming to
the Berne Convention and the enactment of a trademark law providing certain
minimum rights to owners. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 2, arts. 9, 15; see
also GA 7TFocus Newsletter, Dec. 1993, at 12-14, cited in JOHN H. JACKSON ET
AL., LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 889-92 (3d
ed. 1995) (detailing goals and principles of GATT).
5 Mandated "approximation" or "harmonization" of national law has
played an enormous role in eliminating the thicket of regulatory impediments
to the establishment of the European internal market. See Daniel Vignes, The
Harmonisation of National Legislation and the EEC, 15 EUR. L. REV. 358, 360-67
(1990). The central European lawmaking institutions issue "directives" that
command the European Union ("EU") member states to enact national law
consistent with the terms of the directives. See id. at 367-73 (detailing legal
mechanisms of the EU).
6 See Andrea Schneider, Democracy and Dispute Resolution: Individual
Rights in International Trade Organizations, in Symposium, Linkage as Phe-
nomenon: An Interdisciplinary Approach, 19 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 201
(1998).
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understand these new limits.7 In other instances legislators may
defiantly challenge the trade system.
8
1.2. "Countermands"
More focused democratic criticism has been aimed at dispute
resolution outcomes where standing national measures are de-
clared inconsistent. In these cases, the existing public order is no-
tably disturbed. I will describe these applications of international
trade discipline on national regulation as "countermands," and
then will examine these countermands to see which are truly (or
most offensively) antidemocratic. Within the European Union
("EU"), the European Court of Justice ("ECJ") can set aside a na-
tional measure which conflicts with the obligations contained in
the Treaty of Rome.9 Thus, in the EU case a "countermand" will
have the effect of striking down a national measure. With WTO
and NAFTA dispute resolution, adverse panel reports have no
immediate effect on national law; here "countermands" are largely
declarations of the inconsistency of the national measure with the
relevant regime. Domestic law is undisturbed by a WTO or
NAFTA countermand and simply creates an obligation of the na-
tion to dismantle the inconsistent law. WTO and NAFTA coun-
termands can be disregarded by the offending nation to some de-
gree.
1.2.1. The Tuna/Dolphin Example
The prototypical example of an asserted antidemocratic coun-
termand is Tuna/Dolphin, where a popular U.S. measure was
menaced by the General Agreement of Tariffs and Trade
("GATT") regime.10 In Tuna/Dolphin, a GATT dispute resolu-
Massachusetts recently enacted state purchasing restrictions from compa-
nies doing business in Burma. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN., ch. 7, S 223 (West
1997). It appears that the sponsors of the act were unaware of the existence of
the WTO Government Procurement Agreement (and its potential effect on the
Act) at the time of its passage.
8 Paul Stephan describes these instances as "rebellions," and cites the
Helms-Burton Act as an example. See Paul Stephan, Creative Destruction: Idio-
syncratic Claims of International Law and the Helms-Burton Legislation, 28
STETSON L. REV. (forthcoming 1998).
9 Case 6/64, Costa v. Ente-Nazionale per l'Energia Electrica (ENEL), 1964
E.C.R. 585.
10 United States-Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, Jan. 25, 1991, GATT
B.I.S.D. (39th Supp.) at 155 (1993) [hereinafter "Tuna/Dolphin]. For more
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tion panel found that the U.S. import restrictions on tuna cap-
tured with purse-sein nets (which invariably killed large numbers
of dolphins) were not justified. The United States effectively
blocked adoption of the panel's report; as such the "dolphin-safe"
tuna import restrictions remain in place. Notwithstanding the
survival of the tuna import ban, Tuna/Dolphin generated a tre-
mendous reaction. Environmentalists in the United States re-
ceived a dramatic wake up call that favorable U.S. environmental
legislation might be struck down by international dispute resolu-
tion panels." The holding shocked the broader U.S. public, who
had a fierce attachment to the welfare of dolphins and other ma-
rine mammals. The U.S. legislation deemed inconsistent by the
panel was exceedingly popular. The specter of a GATT panel, set-
ting aside a piece of U.S. legislation with the noble goal of pro-
tecting dolphins, based on the arcane demands of international
trade, seemed to many Americans an assault on their democratic
privileges.
1.3. The Arguments
This essay is neither an apologia for, nor a condemnation of,
international trade regimes. It takes democratic critiques seri-
ously. What I hope to work towards is defining conditions (1)
where the international trade system should yield to national
democratic impulses'2 and (2) where an international trade regime
can effectively support democratic values by displacing antidemo-
cratic national measures or practices.
13
background on Tuna/Dolphin, see Jeffrey Dunoff, Reconciling International
Trade with Preservation of ihe Global Commons: Can We Prosper and Protect?, 49
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1407, 1409-22 (1992) and Joel P. Trachtman, Casenote-
United States-Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, 86 AM. J. INT'LL. 142 (1992).
1 Tuna/Dolphin sparked the "trade and. . ." debate. See Steve Charnovitz,
Green Roots, Bad Pruning: GA 7T Rules and Their Aplication to Environmental
Trade Measures, 7 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 299, 301-02 (1993); Jeffrey L. Dunoff,
'Trade and... ": Recent Developments in Trade Policy and Scholarship--And
Their Surprising Political Implications, 17 NW. J. INT'L L. & BUS. 759 (1997);
Joel P. Trachtman, Trade anid... Problems, Cost-Benefit Analysis and Subsidiar-
ity, 9 EUR. J. INT'L L. 32 (1997).
Philip Nichols has outlined a similar approach. Nichols has looked for
cases where "societal values" are in play, and suggests that in some of these cases
international trade discipline shoud yield to national will. See Philip M.
Nichols, Trade Without Values, 90 Nw. U. L. REV. 658 (1996).
13 In connection with joint U.S.-Mexican administration of the environ-
mental quality of the border area, a public hearing was held in Mexico. The
notion of a public hearing was unprecedented in Mexico. See Rebecca Reynolds
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My initial point is somewhat dark in tone: democracy may be
invoked to mask beggar-thy-neighbor national policies 4 that im-
pose economic harm on unrepresented extranationals. Thus, we
should be cautious in undiscriminatingly accepting those chal-
lenges to countermands that allege democratic failure. 15  I will
suggest that assertions of antidemocratic outcomes can be screened
in order to determine which objections have the most merit (from
the point of view of authentic democratic expression) and where
international trade discipline should yield. Resistant national
measures, those which generate strong support in the face of in-
ternational countermands, should be checked for their authentic-
ity. The most persuasive cases will be those instances (1) where
the national measure reflects a deeply embedded value (which at
times may be idiosyncratic), and (2) where the country imposing
the measure bears the greater part of the cost of any distortion
imposed on international trade by the maintenance of the meas-
ure. These cases will be labeled "self-sacrificing."
My second argument is more positive: that the international
trade regime may exercise its hierarchical superiority to usefully
check national policies that are patently antidemocratic. I intend
this argument to be more subtle than the neoliberal credence that
free trade is the expected "democratic" outcome of a non-
captured, friction-free polity.16 Rather, this second tack involves
Bannister, The Mexican Market and NAFTA, 17 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 533,
548 (1994).
14 "Beggar-thy-neighbor policies" tend to increase the income and welfare
of the nation imposing the policy at the expense of others. See MILTIADES
CHACHOLIADES, INTERNATIONAL EcoNoMIcs 181 (1990). Examples include
optimal tariffs and expenditure switching policies (such as the "Buy America"
program). See id. at 172, 380. Beggar-thy -neighbor policies often invite retalia-
tion. See id. at 380. According to Jagdish B a ati, "t]he Great Depression
had been associated with beggar-my-neighbor policies of competitive exchange-
rate depreciation and tariff escalation, each aimed at preserving and deflecting
aggregate demand toward one's own industries at the expense of those of one's
tradiig partners." JAGDISH BHAGWATI, PROTECTIONISM 20 (1988).
15 Robert Hudec points out that the Smoot-Hawley tariff was"one of the
most perfectly 'democratic' statutes ever enacted." Robert E. Hudec, "Circum-
venting" Democracy: The Political Morality of Trade Negotiations, 25 N.Y.U. J.
INT'L L. & POL. 311, 312 (1993).
16 Bhagwati describes "recent developments in the theory of political econ-
omy and international trade that replaced the orthodox view that governments
are benign and omnipotent with the view that their policies may reflect lobby-
ing by pressure groups (which lobbying may lead to defects in the visible hand
that outweigh ones in the invisible hand for which remedy is sought)."
BHAGWATI, supra note 14, at 31.
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a search for analogs to the federal dismantling of "democratically"
enacted "Jim Crow" laws in the South, or the use of economic
sanctions to accelerate the fall of apartheid.
The points advanced here are suggestive of reforming moves
that could be applied to discrete cases reducing the possibility for
"trade and..." style tensions.17 Respecting democratic will and
national autonomy in these cases can further legitimate the trade
system. The first reform would be to recognize the special status
of national measures which are authentic and self-sacrificing. The
second is to use trade principles to encourage democratic expres-
sion among all members of the international trade community.
This discussion will necessarily confront rival conceptualiza-
tions of democracy.' 8 Every nation has its own internal notions
of democracy and legitimacy. These notions may not be widely
shared in the international community. As such, some national
measures may be viewed as more legitimate, based on an assess-
ment of the state of democracy within the relevant nation. This
line will not be pursued here. Rather the relevant critiques exam-
ined here are those which challenge the democratic legitimacy of
the operation of the international trade system in specific in-
stances. The spirit of this critique leaves national lawmaking, and
its legitimacy, largely unexamined. That being said, I will still
seek to look through to the level of national enactment for pur-
poses of democratic inquiry.
Some useful progress can be made, for purposes of this essay,
by defining democracy in the negative. Democracy cannot be a
quality that attaches with equivalent force to all formal enact-
ments of a popularly elected legislature. This would suggest that
17 "Trade and. . .," captures the collisions between the demands of a regime
dedicated to facilitating international trade, and the national and international
pursuit of other political goals. These collisions may be seen as general phe-
nomena: For e xample, one assertion is that the WTO as a whole is antithetical
to sustainable development, in which case "trade and..." is voiced as a general
critique. Alternatively, a "trade and..." collision may be identified in a par-
ticular case. See Trachtman, supra note 11 (explaining that "Trade and..." dis-
putes may or may not signal democratic dysfunction of legitimate concern).
'Trade and..." also identifies a body of scholarship. See Dunoff, supra note 11.
1 See Philip M. Nichols, Extension of Standing in World Trade Organization
Disputes to Nongovernment Parties, 17 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 295, 310-14
(1996) (detailing criticisms of traditional democratic models). For several ap-
proaches to democratic modeling, see ROBERT DAHL, DEMOCRACY AND ITS
CRITIcS (1989); RONALD ROGOWSKI, COMMERCE AND COALITIONS (1989);
DANIEL VERDIER, DEMOCRAcY AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE: BRITAIN,
FRANCE, AND THE UNrED STATES, 1860-1990 (1994).
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all national measures should be equally resistant to international
trade scrutiny. Such a definition would leave us with our present
predicament: either all national measures stand (as they are valid
democratic expressions), or none do (as democracy is not a value
recognized by the international trade system). Nor do I intend
the use of simple (imaginary) plebiscites to test the democratic
commitment behind adopted measures. Whatever democracy is,
it is something more subtle than the approaches suggested.
2. DEMOCRATIC CRITIQUES
2.1. Forms of General Critique of International Trade Regimes
The establishment and expansion of the key international
trade institutions have been accompanied by criticism and protest.
Certain critiques are attacks on the neoliberal premises of free
trade.' 9 Other critics oppose an international order dominated by
multinational enterprises operating unchecked by meaningful
regulation.
20
Opponents also assert the presence of serious democratic defi-
ciencies to undercut the legitimacy of the trade regimes. All the
major international trade institutions, such as the WTO, EU and
NAFTA are at least doubly removed from the people and are this
exposed to complaints about a lack of democratic accountability. 2'
The recent U.S. ratification experiences, first with NAFTA, and
later with the Uruguay Round amendments to the GATT system,
prompted numerous critiques of the respective regime's anti-
democratic nature. These critics oppose the movement of author-
19 See, e.g., Jane B. Baron & Jeffrey L. DunoffAgainst Market Rationality:
Moral Critiques of Economic Analysis in Legal Theory, 17 CARDOZO L. REV. 431
(1996).
20 See RALPH NADER, THE CASE AGAINST FREE TRADE: GATT,
NAFTA, AND THE GLOBALIZATION OF CORPORATE POWER (1993).
21 Paul Stephan has examined the link between accountability and legiti-
macy within international lawmaking institutions. See Paul Stephan, Account-
ability and International Lawmaking: Rules, Rents and Legitimacy, 17 Nw. J.
INT'L L. & Bus. 681 (1997).
22 See C. O'Neal Taylor, Fast Track, Trade Policy, and Free Trade Agree-
ments: Why NAFTA Turned into a Battle, 28 GEo. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON.
2 (1994); see also Jeffrey Atik, Remarks, in CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL
LAW ISSUES: OPPORTUNITIES AT A TIME OF MoMENToUs CHANGE 221 (Renef
Lefeber ed., 1994) (elucidating countries' positions on NAFTA).
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ity over standards from arguably more democratic national insti-
tutions to less democratic international ones.2
3
More subtle arguments note the implicit shift of regulatory
authority within national institutions. In the United States, for
example, "Fast Track" authorization shifts substantive regulatory
power from the Congress to the arguably less-democratically ac-
countable executive branch.24 A further shift in authority runs
from the states to the more distant federal government through
the operation of the Supremacy Clause. Within the European
Union, critics identify the "democratic deficit" attending the ma-jor EU"• • 26
jor EU institutions. Recent and recurring increases in the law-
making role of the European Parliament are a partial response to
these "democratic deficit" concerns.
2 7
A more precise legitimacy critique asserts the democratic chal-
lenge from the perspective of each participating polity. Here it is
the internal democratic support for a specific nation's participa-
tion in a regime which is challenged. For example, while Den-
mark's joining the WTO may be understood as a democratic
2 It may not be a given that the more remote international institution is
less democratic than the national one. See Hudec, supra note 15, at 312-13.
24 See BRUCE ACKERMAN & DAvID GOLOVE, Is NAFTA CONSTI-
TUTIONAL? (1995); Harold H. Koh, The Fast Track and United States Trade Pol-
icy, 18 BROOK. J. INT'LL. 143 (1992).
2 See U.S. CONsT. art. VI, cl. 2 ("This Constitution, and the Laws of the
United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made,
or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the
supreme Law of the Land.... ."). Matters traditionally left to the states may
suddenly be federalized by entry of an international treaty on the subject. For
example, the WTO Government Procurement Agreement, signed by the
United States, now disciplines certain state purchasing procedures. See Agree-
ment on Government Procurement, reprinted in MESSAGE FROM THE
PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES TRANSM1THNG THE URUGUAY ROUND
TRADE AGREEMENTS, TEXTS OF AGREEMENTS, IMPLEMENTING BILL,
STATEMENT OF ADMINISTRATIVE AcTION AND REQUIRED SUPPORTING
STATEMENTS, H.R. DOC. No. 316, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 1719 (1994).
26 See, e.g., Joseph H.H. Weiler, The Transformation of Europe, 100 YALE
L.J. 2403 (1991).
27 See Joseph H.H. Weiler, Parlement Europeen, Integration Europeenne,
Drnocratie et Ldgitimit, in LE PARLEMENT EUROPIEN (Louis & Waelbroeck
eds., 1988). The European democratic deficit is compounded by the fact that
the central EU institutions (Council, Commission, Court of Justice) respond, if
at all, to the current governments (in the parliamentary sense) of the respective
member states, effectively disenfranchising those social elements in each mem-
ber state habitually standing outside parliamentary majorities.
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act,28 Indonesia's membership is simply another act of an autoc-
racy. Similarly, one might be somewhat more inclined to accept
NAFTA's democratic legitimacy as to the United States,29 fast-
track doubts notwithstanding, than were one to contemplate the
legitimacy of the NAFTA adhesion of Mexico. U.S. participation
in NAFTA, after all, was implemented by an act of Congress3°
and should enjoy the same presumption of legitimacy as any other
federal statute. In Mexico, NAFTA was approved by the con-
trolled Senate which can be viewed as simply having carried out
the political will of then-President 
Salinas. 3  
Finally, a general democratic critique may be aimed at inter-
national trade regimes which offer entry to (and imply support
for) admittedly undemocratic states. In the case of the European
Union, at least, a convincing embrace of democracy by entrants
Spain, Portugal, and Greece had been an unavoidable ticket of
admission to EU membership. The same will be insisted of the
prospective former-Eastern bloc members.
In the case of NAFTA, the inclusion of Mexico into what had
been a U.S.-Canada free trade area was thought to encourage more
open democratic politics than has been practiced in the modern
Mexican experience. 2 Admission to NAFTA has been used as a
carrot of inducement as opposed to a carrot of reward. NAFTA's
supporters, within and outside Mexico, have conceded that a great
deal of Mexican political reform is a'faire. Critics of NAFTA of-
ten characterize hopes of political reform in Mexico as naive, and
impute Mexico's democratic shortcomings to NAFTA as a whole.
28 For a discussion of Danish constitutional limits on membership in inter-
national organizations, see Nicolai Ronnebek Hinrichsen, The Constitutional
Objection to European Union Membership: A Challenge for the Danish Supreme
Court, 15 B.U. INT'L LJ. 571 (1997).
29 Note, however, that a pre-ratification poll in the United States showed
only 33% of the U.S. public supported NAFTA. See Taylor, supra note 22, at 2
n.4. International treaties whi~ch are signed by the President of the Republic
and approved by the Camara de Senadores (Mexican Senate) are the supreme law
of Mexico. See CONST. art. 133 (Mex.).
'0 See North American Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act, 19
U.S.C. S 3301 (1998).
31 See Taylor, supra note 22, at 52 n.241; see also CARLOS FUENTES, A NEW
TIME FOR MEXICO 132 (1996) (mentioning that NAFTA was never subject to
public debate in Mexico, despite the wealth of publicity the agreement had
abroad, and suggesting that the secrecy surrounding it was merely typical
authoritarian treatment).
32 See Housman, supra note 1, at 721.
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The WTO is quite indifferent as to the presence or absence of
democracy within its ranks. Although a special regime was con-
structed to permit state controlled economies to appropriately in-
teract with more market-oriented trading partners, the former
GATT included a large number of Marxist-Leninist states. WTO
membership currently includes Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Indonesia,
and Burma-nations which are hardly noted for democratic prac-
tices. As such, WTO may receive an antidemocratic taint from
the participation of certain members.
33
Thus, in order to meet a broad democratic challenge to an in-
ternational trade regime, an apologist must demonstrate (1) that
the regime is sensitive to democratic expression, (2) that member-
ship in the regime is democratically supported, and (3) that the
regime does not flagrantly embrace antidemocratic govern-
ments.
34
2.2. Narrow Critiques ofParticular Outcomes
An alternative line of criticism questions the democratic na-
ture of particular trade dispute outcomes. Rather than objecting
to NAFTA, they challenge a particular NAFTA countermand. I
will call these specific objections "narrow critiques." An analysis
of particular narrow critiques is likely to reveal a fairly strong
correlation with the general positions advocated by various anti-
trade constituencies. An environmentalist opponent of WTO
will reliably oppose the various WTO countermands that under-
mine environmental objectives. A critic unhappy with the sub-
stantive effect of a countermand will be tempted to add demo-
cratic failure to her list of substantive objections.
In order for a narrow, dispute-specific democratic critique to
have independent meaning, it should do more than categorically
restate the substantive objections. The critique should address
democracy as a central value. The following sections present an
attempt to examine admissible grounds for a democratic critique
of certain trade dispute resolution outcomes in order to usefully
discriminate among cases. For the sake of clarifying these argu-
ments only, I will concede the general legitimacy of the trade re-
gime in question. Thus, for purposes of the following sections,
33 See Nichols, supra note 18, at 310-14.
34 NAFTA and the WTO would likely fail these tests. A better case might
be made for the European Union.
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broader democratic objections will be put on hold, notwithstand-
ing their robustness and appeal.
I will examine disputes about particular outcomes reached
within trade-oriented fora that are challenged for inadequately
weighing non-trade values. These are special critiques of an inter-
national trade regime and its pretense to scrutinize all national
law and regulation for their compatibility with free trade. I am
not proposing here the establishment of an even higher level of
review, such as a chancery of international trade equity that could
correct the rigidities and lack of democratic sensitivity of interna-
tional trade law. Rather, I intend to use these ex post critiques as
guides to craft screens that can be used by dispute resolution bod-
ies to identify those most "touchy" cases that perhaps should be
avoided.36
A proponent of a particular rival agenda (be it environmental-
ism, human rights, or labor empowerment) merely wishes to
catapult a higher value to trump trade. This critique, as to the
world trade system, is necessarily radical (though for strategic
purposes, it may be advanced on a case-by-case basis). It is easy to
imagine that any such advocate might borrow the rhetoric of de-
mocracy to justify a wished-for subordination of trade hegemony.
Thus, these critiques subtly or crudely equate their higher value
with democratic expression. 37 From an institutionalist perspec-
tive, however, where all values, including trade values, are in play,
it is helpful to filter out for consideration those cases where
democratic criticism adds more, or is more deeply founded, than
to decry the subjugation of a non-trade value.
Particularistic critics have various agendas. Countermands
engage the affected constituencies of the stricken measure. At the
margin, international trade regimes divide and conquer by isolat-
ing opposition by the bounds of particular cases. Alliances may
be formed opposing the establishment or expansion of a trade re-
gime, such as the labor-green axis opposed to NAFTA.38 When
35 Examples include GATT, WTO, and NAFTA panels, and the ECJ.
31 Use of these screens could suggest instances of abstention. Note that the
recent WTO dispute resolution reforms have stripped away a country's ability
to block adoption of a panel report. See John H. Jackson, The WTO Dispute
Settlement Understanding--Misuniderstandings on the Nature of Legal Obligations,
91 AM. J. INT'L L. 60, 61 (1997).
37 For example, increased labor rights are per se pro-democratic.
38 See Atik, supra note 22, at 221; see also George de Lama & Vincent J.
Schodolski, Unlikely Allies Fight NAFTA, Cm1. TRIB., Sept. 20, 1993, at 1.
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facing discrete countermands, however, such alliances will likely
fail to coalesce. Environmentalists and labor have an uneasy rela-
tionship in domestic politics which may discourage cooperation
in international matters. Groups generally inclined to oppose a
trade regime may find themselves with opposing stakes in a par-
ticular dispute outcome.
3. FIRsT ORDER PROBLEMS WTH NARROW CRITIQUES
3.1. Narrow Critiques May Simply Restate Protectionism
Are all democratic urges deserving of equal weight? Democ-
racy may be too crude a measure for assessing the legitimacy of
many trade dispute outcomes. Every panel which sets aside a na-
tional measure is open to a facial democratic challenge.39 Again,
when stated so baldly, the democratic critique is unremarkable,
and simply repeats the loss-of-sovereignty mantra: International
trade panels should not tell national authorities what they can and
cannot do.
Not all national measures capture the public imagination with
equal force, however. The popularity of a national measure can
be seen by the hue and cry which results when it is challenged by
another country. No doubt dolphins engaged the American pub-
lic more so than the reformulated gasoline standards. Some mat-
ters are of vital importance and democratic interest, but are popu-
larly viewed as technical. Other matters, like the Tuna/Dolphin
issue, may not represent significant volumes of trade but will trig-
ger fierce national reactions when attacked by outsiders. There-
fore, some countermands will be popularly viewed as more anti-
democratic than others.
Protectionism, the central target of so much trade discipline,
may be rationally and democratically instituted by a national pol-
ity. Concerted actors, such as the agricultural and steel industry
lobbies, have been successful all over the world in securing protec-
tive measures. Requiring the international trade system to in-
dulge clearly projectionist law on the theory that a state may well
democratically endorse these policies would undo most of trade
law and much of its economic advantage.
3 The presence of identifiable democratic failings in the nation adopting
the measure undercuts the force of the resistance to the international discipline.
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Protectionism is more than an economic evil signaling the
squander of potential gains in trade. It may also be a democratic
evil, if it results in a faction (i.e. local producers) imposing welfare
losses on the broader ublic (consumers who pay higher prices).
The Kaldor-Hicks test is not satisfied in many cases of protec-
tionism; the benefits received by the protected producers fail to
outweigh the losses imposed on the rest of society. Thus, even if
the producers' gains were captured (through a tax, for example),
society is worse off (at least in a material sense). This follows
from the familiar neoclassical argument that protectionism is self-
defeating. It also signals a breakdown of the democratic process in
many cases.
3.2. Narrow Critiques May Mask Externalization ofEconomic
Harm
A second use (or misuse) of a narrow democratic critique is to
support a national measure that has the effect of imposing eco-
nomic harm on either identifiable trading partners or on the sys-
tem as a whole. In many cases, the rhetoric of democracy is used
to justify national measures that externalize, or would externalize
if permitted to stand, economic harms internationally.
41
The problem here is not so much the incompatibility of in-
ternational trade discipline with democracy per se, but is rather a
problem of identifying what is the appropriate demos.42 Democ-
40 The Kaldor-IHicks test assesses the efficiency gain of a particular move.
See J.R. Hicks, The Valuation of the Social Income, 7 ECONOMICA 105, 110
(1940); Nicholas Kaldor, Welfare Propositions of Economics and Inter-Personal
Comparisons of Utility, 49 ECON. J. 549, 550 (1939).
According to Kaldor-Hicks efficiency, one state of affairs, S2, is more effi-
cient than another, S1, if in going from S1 to 52, the people who benefit from
the change could compensate the people who lose and still remain better off.
See JEFFRIE G. MURPHY & JULES L. COLEMAN, PHILOSOPHY OF LAW: AN
INTRODUCTION TO JURISPRUDENCE 186 (rev. ed., 1990). Nevertheless, note
that the Kaldor-Hicks test does not anticipate the actual payment of any com-
pensation. See, e.g., Christopher T. Wonnell, The Structure of a General heory
of Nondisclosure, 41 CASE . RES. L. REv. 329, 336 & n.41 (1991) (offering a
hypothetical application of the Kaldor-Hicks test).41
For example, there are numerous economic policy tools available to na-
tions to effectively export unemployment.
42 This is an echo of Weiler's work on democracy in the European Union.
See Joseph H.H. Weiler, The State "Ober Alles.- Demos, Telos and the German
Maastricht Decision (Harvard Jean Monnet Working Papers No. 6/95), avail-
able at Jonathan Katchen, The Jean Monnet Chair (visited May 4, 1998)
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racy operating at the North American level (were this institution-
ally imaginable) might prevent national externalizing moves that
otherwise would have been implemented at the U.S., Canadian,
or Mexican level. It may be, as some have argued, that the notion
of democracy loses its force when applied at the international or
universal level. Thus, an international rule-making mechanism
which weighs cross-border economic effects may appeal to effi-
ciency or wealth maximization or even distribution as a touch-
stone for its legitimacy, but it cannot appeal to democracy. Na-
tional institutions primarily reflect national interests. There may
be duties a polity owes to foreign interests affected by domestic
measures, but such a duty does not include any kind of demo-
cratic franchise.43 Nor do we require that democracies give specu-
lative consideration to how foreigners may have acted were a
franchise available to them. The foreigner is expressly denied any
democratic voice. Taken to the extreme, this line of reasoning
may move a democracy to be other-disregarding in its policies.44
A simple, clarifying move would be to dismiss trade objec-
tions premised on self-serving measures.4' The mere presence of
self-interest should not automatically disqualify a democratic chal-
lenge to a particular outcome, but self-interest unchecked cer-
tainly raises serious concerns. 46 For an internationalist, much of
the attractiveness of international trade law is its encouragement
of other-regarding political behavior. There is currently no de-
veloped or even articulated general theory of imposition of eco-
< http://www.law.harvard.edu/Programs/eanMonnet/papers/95/9506ind.ht
ml>.
43 But note that EU nationals who are residents in other EU member states
are permitted to vote in local and municipal elections. See TREATY ESTAB-
LISHING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, Feb. 7, 1992, art. 8(b), O.J. (C 224) 1
(1992), 1 C.M.L.R. 573 (1992) [hereinafter EC TREATY].
44 There is a body of legal literature addressing the effect of the lack of rep-
resentation for out-of-state interests in U.S. Commerce Clause cases. See, e.g.,
Jacques Lebouef, The Economics of Federalism and the Proper Scope of the Federal
Commerce Power, 31 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 555 (1994).
45 Indeed, trade regimes are generally hostile to "disguised restraints on
trade." TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY,
openedfor signature Mar. 25, 1957, art. 36, 298 U.N.T.S. 11 (1958) [hereinafter
EC TREATY]; General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, art.
XX, 61 Stat. A-11, T.I.A.S. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT].
46 See In the Matter of Lobsters from Canada, U.S.-Can. Free Trade Agree-
ment Binational Panel Review, Panel No. USA 83-1807-01, May 25, 1990,
available in 1990 FTAPD LEXIS 11 (discussing the panel's acknowledgment of
both protectionist and conservationist motives).
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nomic harm in the international law. Rather, we have a patch-
work of norms, including the outside limits on the imposition of
boycotts and sanctions and the various strands of national and in-
ternational response to defined unfair practices in trade law. An
immunizing recognition of democracy may retard the develop-
ment of international law that might appropriately contain cross-
border economic harm.
3.3. Narrow Critiques May Restate "Trade and..." Claims
There is certainly something important about "trade and..
controversies. That is, international trade cases exist where the
results driven by neoliberal principles should yield to other val-
ues. We should have the opportunity to consider, at least,
whether our concerns with fairness to workers, environmental
quality, or preservation of a culture justify a relaxation of trade
rules. Which are the appropriate "trade and..." cases is more
problematic. All political actors have non-trade values which
they might well prefer to trump the shared interest for open mar-
kets. While greens, labor organizers and human rights activists
may share a common opposition to the hegemony of the world
trade system, they may differ as to which alternative values
should rule, and under what circumstances.
In short, there are few widely-shared, noncontroversial values
available. Where there is broad agreement across nations about
higher values (such as banning goods produced by prison labor
48
or protecting endangered species) the trade system has responded
by recognizing exceptions. 4 Other interests, less able to com-
4 Philip Nichols calls these "societal values." See Nichols, supra note 12, at659.
48 See Charnovitz, supra note 11, at 323 & n.133.
4 The terms of GATT permit import restrictions on goods produced with
prison labor. See GATT art. XX(e). Further prohibitions exist on trade in en-
dangered species. See id arts. XX~o), XX(g).
This suggests that qualifying non-trade values should earn a place on the
lists of exceptions, such as the GATT's article XX. Article 36 of the EEC
TREATY is not the sole source of qualifying justifications for derogations from
the Free Movement of Goods principle; there is also a general category of
"mandatory requirements" which go beyond the exceptions listed. See Case
120/78, Rewe-Zentral AG v. Bundesmonopolverwaltung fUr Branntwein
(Cassis de Dijon), 1979 E.C.R. 649, [1979] 3 C.M.L.R. 494 (1979). "Mandatory
requirements" are now labeled "public-interest objectives" under Joined Cases
C-267 & C-268/91, Keck and Mithouard, 1993 E.C.R. 1-6097, [1995] 1
C.M.L.R. 101 (1995).
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mand the consensus necessary for vaulting above the trade re-
gimes,50 may best argue for some balancing, winning some cases
and losing others.
"Trade and..." style controversies have arisen in part because
the trade regimes were unable to anticipate regulatory develop-
ments and so failed to include appropriate derogations. The
Treaty of Rome does not include exceptions for environmental
regulation or consumer protection; in fact environmental protec-
tion per se was outside the competency of the European Economic
Community.51 Thus, the ECJ produced environmental and con-
sumer protection derogations out of whole cloth. They made the
correct political judgment that, had the Treaty of Rome been
drafted twenty years later, such accommodations would have
been expressly provided.52
Likewise, GATT's treatment of environmental policies is
awkward.53 Article XX(b) provides an accommodation for meas-
ures necessary to promote human, animal and plant life or health
and Article XX(g) permits measures relating to the conversation
of natural resources.54  Thus, GATT's compatibility with such
basic environmental regulation as the Clean Air Act was an open
controversy. It interesting to ponder whether most notorious
"trade and..." cases would have arisen if GATT had been drafted
in 1987 as opposed to 1947, 55 where awareness and understanding
50 Daniel Esty has argued for a "GATT for the environment" which would
be a parallel regime to the trading system capable of weighing environmental
values. See generally DANIEL ESTY, GREENING THE GATT: TRADE, EN-
VIRONMENT, AND THE FuTURE (1994).
51 Harmonization of environmental standards was authorized as an ancil-
lary goal to the creation of the internal market. See Case 92/79, Commission v.
Italy, 1990 E.C.R. 1115.52 . .. ..e poecin eCassis de Dijon recogmzed consumer protection as a "mandatory re-
quirement" that could justify trade restrictions. See Cassis de Dijon, 1979
E.C.R. at 661. In Case 302/86, Commission v. Denmark (Disposable Beer
Cans), 1988 E.C.R. 4607, [1989] 1 C.M.L.R. 619 (1989), the ECJ held that envi-
ronmental protection was a mandatory requirement.
53 See Steve Charnovitz, Environmental Trade Sanctions and the GA T.An
Analysis of the Pelly Amendment on Foreign Environmental Practices, 9AM. U. J.
INT'L L. & POL'Y 751 (1994).
" See id at 780-90 (discussing the central role the Article XX(b) and Article
XXV) exceptions play in GAT7).
Bermann makes a similar speculation with respect to Article 36 of the
Treaty of Rome. See GEORGE BERMANN ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON
EuROPEAN COmmuNrTY LAW (noting that if Article 36 had been drafted in
1977 instead of 1957, it would have included consumer rights and environ-
mental protection).
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of environmental issues are heightened.16 One can imagine a re-
drafted Article XX section that would generally exempt envi-
ronmental measures,5 7 subject of course to the overall limit on
disguised restraints on trade. 8 Those "trade and..." cases which
simply reflect the obsolescence of the trade regime are best han-
dled by either expressly amending the provision or by creative
(and sensitive) rulings in dispute resolution.
5 9
In some sense, the "trade and.. ." opposition may simply
point at the democracy deficit affecting all superior legal hierar-
chy (like U.S.-style federalism); the neoliberal trade agenda hap-
pens to be the particular set of values driving the highest order of
law. "Trade and..." tensions may simply replay the familiar
populist-democratic critique of U.S. constitutional federalism.
However, as in the United States, it is not always clear that the
local is more democratic than the national.
Alternate values may be directly promoted by trade oppo-
nents. An environmentalist might prefer a "sustainable develop-
ment" ethic over neoliberal trade principles. On the other hand,
an environmentalist might also prefer "sustainable development"
over democracy. 60 The democratic critique of the international
trade regime is special. It signals more than substantive disagree-
ment over policy objectives. It challenges both the ranking of
public values as well as the legitimacy of the system.
"Trade and. .." conflicts may be an unavoidable artifact of
the relatively primitive institutional design of the world trade sys-
56 NAFTA is somewhat more respectful of national environmental meas-
ures. See Jeffery Atik, Environmental Standards within NAFTA: Difference by
Design and the Retreatfrom Harmonization, 3 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 81
(1995). But see Steve Charnovitz, The North American Free Trade Agreement:
Green Law or Green Spin?, 26 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 1 (1994).
57 But note that Article XX was not amended when the GATT was re-
stated as GATT 1994 as a part of the WTO Agreement.
58 This overall check on an otherwise permitted national measure is pro-
vided in the so-called "chapeau" or preface of Article XX. Under the Article
XX chapeau, GATT-inconsistent national measures qualifying under an Article
XX exception are permitted "[subject to the requirements that such measures
are not applied in a manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or un-
justifiable discrimination between countries where like conditions prevail, or a
disguised restriction on [international] trade." GATT art. XX.
9 See Charnovitz, supra note 53 (discussing the possibility of judicial activ-
ism in WTO dispute resolution).
60 See ANNA BRAMWELL, ECOLOGY IN THE 20TH CENTURY 161-74 (1989)
(discussing links between the early environmental movement and protofas-
cism).
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tern. We might generally agree, when facing a specific contro-
versy, that certain non-trade values should be promoted in that
context. We might not, however, be able to describe these cases
ex ante, either in general principle or by providing specific excep-
tions. Our second best approach is to pose trade values as a
dominant rule, and then deal with the anticipated slipping and
sliding later. This approach would view many "trade and..."
disputes as instances of institutional inaccuracy.6 1 Through the
ongoing process of (appropriately informed) dispute resolution,
the history of these conflicts would provide nuanced pairings of
trade and other values, contouring the functioning of the trade re-
gime to a broader experience.
A free-trade driven presumptive rule only makes sense if the
authentic challenges are relatively rare. If the conflicts between
trade and other values are consistent and irreducible, we have not
advanced the discourse, or institutional efficiency, by putting
trade first and foremost. One's view on this is likely to track
one's political preferences: a free-trader will see "true" non-trade
challenges as exceptional. A labor advocate might see free-trade as
serving the public good only infrequently and then largely by ac-
cident.
The so-called "Washington Consensus" 62 sees neoliberalism as
a favored principle, both as a guide for international interactions
and as a higher value within respective national polities.6 ' This-. • 64
right or wrong-is a particular set of political beliefs. An inter-
national system built on free trade can function without an insis-
tence that free-trade be adopted as an internal test for policy mak-
ing. Indeed, the creaky old GATT regime managed to function
along with the creaky old non-market economies. Furthermore,
61 See Trachtman, supra note 11, at 19-26.
62 The term "Washington Consensus" is used to describe the various policy
prescriptions of international lending institutions, primarily the Intemational
Monetary Fund ("IMR  ") for developing nations. These include tariff reduc-
tions, liberalization of restrictions on foreign direct investment and fiscal pro-
bity, often involving austerity measures. At times, implementation of these
prescriptions are a condition for IMF lendin%. See S. Neal McKnight, Stepping
Stones to Reform: The Use of Capital Controls in Economic Liberalization, 82 VA.
L. REv. 859 (1996).
63 See Paul Krugman, Dutch Tulips and Emerging Markets, FOREIGN AFF.,
July/Aug. 1995, at 28, 28-29.
'64 See Tamara Lothian, The Democratized Market Economy in Latin America
(and Elsewhere): An Exercise in Institutional Thinking Within Law and Political
Economy, 28 CORNELL INT'L Lj. 169 (1995).
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the so-called "interface" issues seemed more of interest to academ-
ics than the interested policy makers. 65  Trade values will con-
tinue to enjoy an inherent advantage, even if trade discipline is
open to attack and compromise through an institutionalized in-
teraction with other values.
4. IDENTIFICATION OF ANTIDEMOCRATIC OUTCOMES
4.1. Transcendentalism
For the moment, let us accept the primary role that free trade
values have, at least within the international economic regime,
and ask ourselves under what conditions can the prescriptions of
free trade be set aside for other values based on democratic con-
cerns. In other words, a democratic critique of trade values
should be a special critique, presenting more (and perhaps less)
than a direct collision of competing values.
And, if we avoid, for the time being, a general democratic cri-
tique, how can we evaluate discrete cases to see if democratic con-
cerns have been appropriately integrated? At one extreme, we
can suggest a transcendental method: an observer might divine a
democratic rod to measure trade dispute results. There may be
easy cases where this feeling-in-the-dark can generate broad con-
sensus. Apartheid is so clearly antidemocratic (and evil), and is so
generally recognized as such, that import restrictions and other
economic sanctions should be allowed to stand, whatever the im-
peratives of international trade. These clearly antidemocratic
cases are few. More would be inclined to dispute, say, whether
government dominated trade unionism, as exists in Mexico, is so
clearly antidemocratic as to justify departures from trade disci-
pline. And even more might fail to see how concerns about de-
mocracy justify import restrictions dedicated to preserving ma-
rine mammals. Transcendentalism, to the extent it works, marks
only a small number of cases where trade discipline should yield
to democracy. By negative implication, it preserves the hierarchi-
cal presumption of trade values in many more cases where a
searching democratic critique might be valuable.
65 See JACKSON ET AL., supra note 4, at 1140-42 (noting problems which
occur under GATT when a market economy and state trading economy
"interface").
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4.2. Motives and Complex Coalitions
Motives are important in considering a democratic critique.
Indeed, it is precisely the expressiveness of democratic will that
lends a presumption of legitimacy to an enactment. Motives are
not easy to isolate in contemporary lawmaking, where indirect
democracy is at work. While lawmakers will dutifully assert
compliance with the democratic will (as they understand it), we
are all keenly aware of the raging influence of interest group poli-
tics. If anything, interest group politics should be more prevalent
in matters affecting international trade, as certain broad interests
(such as consumers generally and the perhaps legitimate interest of
extranationals) are more weakly represented.
Thus, a national opinion poll may show wide popular support
for dolphin protection. The enactment of the Marine Mammal
Protection Act, however, more likely results from the felicitous
convergence of animal rights and U.S. fishing interests.66 Should
tuna import restrictions be immune from the trade rules because
the restrictions (and dolphins) are popular in the U.S.? Should
the measures be struck down because they result from special in-
terest politics? Legislative motives are likely to be unreliable
guides in assessing which challenges should be heard.
4.3. Authenticity and Idiosyncratic Tastes
We can insist, as a condition to recognizing a democratic ob-
jection, that the objection be advanced in good faith and not as a
pretext for antisocial behavior. Not all trade disputes involve
authentic democratic expressions. Indeed, there are instances
where countries have welcomed trade discipline as a viable re-
sponse to internal political conflicts.67 Asking when a democratic
objection is authentic is a transcendental technique, and so is sub-
ject to unreliability. As a screen however, it may identify the
" The Pelly Amendment provisions challenged by Mexico in
Tuna/Dolphin were part of a statute named, with charming transparency, the
Fishermen's Protective Act. See Tuna/Dolphin, supra note 10, at 171.
67 To some extent, the United States welcomed the holding of the WTO
Appellate Body in United States-Standards for Reformulated and Conventional
Gasoline, 35 I.L.M. 603 (1996). Although the United States lost the dispute, the
Appellate Body clarified the operation of Article XX exception with respect to
the Clean Air Act. See Maury D. Shenk, International Decision: United States-
Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, 90 AM. J. INT'L L. 669
(1996).
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baldest cases where democracy is merely a guise for irresponsibil-
ity, and deflect them from further consideration.
I would further refine a test for authenticity to take into ac-
count idiosyncratic tastes: where these are present, democratic
expression is worthy of greater consideration. This approach suf-
fers from the problems of identifying motives within complex
coalitions, discussed above. Still, there are situations, like Japanese
Rice,68 where more is at stake than the desire of Japanese rice
growers for protection; like Canadian Magazines,69 where more is
at stake than the economic viability of Canadian publishers.
4.4. Kosher Meat
Religious or cultural practices may be a source of idiosyncratic
stances. For example, Israel forbids the importation of non-
kosher meat.70  The import ban on non-kosher meat can be de-
scribed as idiosyncratic as (1) it is likely unique to Israel and (2) it
is motivated, at least in part and probably in large part, by non-
economic concerns.7 1 The United States agreed to not challenge
the Israeli import ban on non-kosher meat as part of the U.S.-
Israel Free Trade Agreement.72 Curiously, Israel does not forbid
the production of non-kosher meat within its territory. Notwith-
standing this clear instance of import discrimination, the United
States recognized the intense interest of Israel in supporting Jew-
ish dietary restrictions. 3 While it is true U.S. non-kosher meat
producers are denied access to the Israeli markets by operation of
the import ban, they presumably have access to most of the
world's other markets. Thus, the uniqueness of the import ban
68 See infra discussion and accompanying notes Section 5.2.
69 See infra discussion and accompanying notes Section 5.3.
70 See Daphne Barak-Erez, From an Unwritten to a Written Constitution:
The Israeli Challenge in American Perspective, 26 COLum. HUM. RTS. L. REV.
309, 330 n.100 (1995) (citing Hok Yevu Basar Kofu, "Import of Frozen Meat
Law," 1994, S.H. 101).
71 Again, motivation is a slippery concept in indirect politics. There were
likely supporters of the import ban who acted for religious reasons; likely pres-
ent too were Israeli butchers who sought protection from U.S. competition.
72 See Free Trade Area Agreement, Apr. 22, 1985, U.S.-Isr., art. 8, 24 I.L.M.
653, 656.
73 The U.S. has objected to the refusal by the Israel Rabbinical council to
recognize U.S. kosher standards, effectively barring U.S. kosher meat from the
Israeli market. See Peter Tirshwell, U.S. Queries Israel on Pistachio Imports; Al-
leged Illegal Trade with Iran May Be Harming U.S. Exports, J. COM., Apr. 1,
1997, at Al.
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(and the unlikelihood that other nations will follow it) suggests
that such idiosyncratic measures cause relatively less harm.
5. INTERNALIZATION AND SELF-SACRIFICE
5.1. Self -Sacrificing Measures
We should not defer blindly on democratic grounds to na-
tional measures which have the effect of externalizing economic
harm.74 Given economic linkages, many domestic laws and regu-
lations have effects outside the national borders.7 5 International
trade regimes, such as WTO, NAFTA, and EU, by creating ex-
pectations of free trade, give content to the notion of externaliza-
tion. A U.S. tuna import restriction which puts Mexican fisher-
men out of work should be examined; the externalized costs
imposed on Mexico by the restrictions are real (they may or may
not be justified).
On the other hand, the distortions created by certain national
measures may be largely internalized. These measures should be
given greater deference. My notion here is that democratic ex-
pression should be valued in some rough proportion to the cost
the respective polity is willing to bear. In other words, this test
measures the extent to which the efficiency costs introduced by a
national measure are internalized. I label these cases "self-
sacrificing." That is, we should compare the internalized cost to
the total cost introduced by the measure:
a = Cost borne by nation imposing measure (internalized
cost)
b = Cost borne by other nations affected by measure
(externalized cost)
a + b = Total cost
74 The notion of externalization is problematic. See Joel P. Trachtman, Ex-
ternalities and Extraterritoriality: The Law and Economics of Prescriptive Jurisdic-
tion, in JAGDEEP S. BHANDARI & ALAN 0. SYKEs, EcONOMIC DIMENSIONS IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW: COMPARATIVE AND EMPIRICAL PERSPECTIVES (1997).
75 Trachtman has noted the analogy between the role territoriality plays in
defining international externalities and the role of property in defining exter-
nalization in private law. See id.
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a /[a + b] = Measure of "self-sacrifice"
The greater the degree of "self-sacrifice," the more likely a
democratic claim will be authentic. After all, in these cases the
people invoking the measure are willing to accept economic bur-
dens in order to enjoy certain political preferences.
Note that self-sacrificing measures may still generate consider-
able negative externalities, and so may be challenged by the inter-
national trade regime. Just because the imposing nation bears a
sizable burden due to its trade restrictive practice does not imply
necessarily that other countries do not experience significant eco-
nomic harm. The international trade regimes, as presently con-
structed, do not generally compare the relationship between in-
ternalized and externalized distortions.76 Indeed, a GATT panel
has held that even a de minimis burden on international trade may
be actionable.
77
In the Salmon and Herring case, a U.S.-Canada Free Trade
Agreement ("FTA") panel suggests a test which considers exter-
nalization: would Canada have imposed the landing requirement
(which affected both Canadian and U.S. fishing fleets) if Canadi-
ans bore all the costs of the measure. A conservation measure is
bona fide, and so eligible for an exception, if the imposing nation
would have enacted it even if it had it been obliged to internalize
the burden on international trade.78 Presumably, the test operates
in the opposite direction to suggest instances of disguised restraint
on trade: were a panel to find that the national measure would
not have been adopted in the case of full internalization, the
measure should be presumed to be protectionist. The Salmon and
Herring test asks that one consider a hypothetical situation that is
counterfactual: there are no established means by which coun-
tries will bear the externalization costs of their restrictions. In
this it resembles the Kaldor-Hicks test, with its imagined (non-
existent) compensations between benefited and harmed actors.
79
76 See id. (discussing externalization and prescriptive jurisdiction).
77 See United States-Taxes on Petroleum and Certain Important Substances
(Superfund), June 17, 1987, GATT B.I.S.D. (34th Supp.) at 136 (1988).
78 See In the Matter of Canada's Landing Requirement for Pacific Coast
Salmon and Herring, Panel No. CDA-89-1807-01, 1989 FTAPD LEXIS 6, Oct.
16, 1989.
79 See discussion at supra note 40.
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Self-sacrifice is a similar, but distinct test. Rather than hy-
pothesizing an internalization that does not exist, it measures ex-
ternalization and recognizes it as a cost borne by the larger inter-
national community. It is the overall rapport between internal
and external costs that is the key to the notion of self-sacrifice.
Restrictions of kosher meat are unlikely to significantly harm
U.S. meat producers; most of the cost of the restriction (higher
meat prices) are borne by Israelis. To the extent self-sacrificing
measures impose costs on the larger trading system, the nation
imposing them can be said to bear some important share.
All instances of protectionism involve some degree of inter-
nalization, of course. The U.S. bears some portion of the cost of
dolphin-safe import restrictions by paying higher tuna prices.
Discerning self-sacrifice from protectionism will not always be
easy. Protectionism involves some significant wealth transfer
within the nation imposing the measure and perhaps democratic
failure. Self-sacrifice involves an expression of broadly shared
values and so merits a democratic presumption of legitimacy.
To some extent WTO rules tolerate the maintenance of uni-
lateral trade restrictive measures which are self-sacrificing, in that
a non-complying nation can always elect to pay compensation (or
suffer retaliation). Compensation or retaliation effectively inter-
nalizes much of the external harm of the offending measure. Such
compensation or retaliation may, however, cause additional dis-
tortions. Moreover, the existing liability system still forces an in-
flexible, negative evaluation of some measures that should be re-
spected as relatively selfless democratic urges. The economics of
the WTO dispute system may be working in a helpful direction,
but its politics are problematic.
5.2. Culture and Japanese Rice
Japanese rice exclusions may be an example of a self-sacrificing
measure. The Japanese pay much higher prices for domestic rice
because of the absence of imports, and bear some meaningful por-
tion of the cost of the distortion they generate. Japanese rice is
not a simple case of protectionism by the Japanese rice growers;80
80 During the presentation of this essay at the Linkage as Phenomenon con-
ference, participants offered a variety of accounts, some amusing, of the Japa-
nese rice restrictions. One story suggested that the Japanese rice import ban
was justified by land conservation and flood control concerns. The rice paddies
were an important part of the overall ecosystem.
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rather it is a story about idiosyncratic tastes: the almost incom-
prehensible preference by Japanese consumers for rice grown in
Japan.
Of course, preferences go only so far in telling this story.
Were Japanese consumers to prefer Japanese rice absolutely, the
presence of imported rice in the Japanese market would have no
effect on their patterns of consumption. One doubts the prefer-
ence is quite so strong. Still, one can easily imagine the presence
of some deeper cultural value reflected in the Japanese restrictions
on foreign rice. And it may be that this value cannot be satisfied
by permitting free 6onsumer choice; that in some sense certain
Japanese rice consumers may be offended by others consuming
non-Japanese rice.8 1 In other words, restrictions may be a deeper
democratic result than, simply reflecting either majoritarian
dominance by traditionalists or capture by Japanese rice produc-
ers. If Japanese rice restrictions are a self-sacrificing measure, per-
haps they should be allowed to stand.
5.3. Culture and Canadian Magazines
The importation of "split-run editions" of U.S. periodicals has
been prohibited by Canadian authorities.82  Because of
"grandfather" provisions, Time and Readers Digest had been
permitted to produce special Canadian editions by inserting a
small amount of Canadian-interest material but relying largely
around the U.S. edition content, hence the term, "split run."
Sports Illustrated effectively recreated the split run practice by
transmitting the content of its U.S. edition by satellite for print-
ing in Canada. Thus, no magazines were physically imported
into Canada. A small amount of Canadian editorial was added to
the U.S. product and advertisements were sold to Canadian adver-
tisers. Canada reacted to the entry of Sports Illustrated Canada
by subjecting advertising placed in it to an eighty-percent excise
8' See infra discussion of psychic harm in Section 5.5.
12 U.S. editions are permitted in Canada. Canadian advertisers are discour-
aged from placing advertisements in U.S. editions by the disallowance of tax
deductions. Income Tax Act, R.S.C., ch. 1, S 19 (1985) (Can.); see also Aaron
Scow, The Sports Illustrated Canada Controversy: Canada "Strikes Out" in Its Bid
to Protect Its Periodical Industry from U.S. Split-Run Periodicals, 7 MINN. J.
GLOBAL TRADE 245, 253-54 (1998).
83 See Ronald G. Atkey, Canadian Cultural Industries Exemption from
NAFTA-Its Parameters, 23 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 177 (1997) (Proceedings of the Can-
ada-United States Law Institute Conference: NAFTA Revisited).
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tax. Canada also denied Sports Illustrated Canada favorable post-
age rates. A WTO dispute resolution panel agreed with the
United States that the excise tax was discriminatory in effect, and
so a violation of GATT article ].
s84
Canada's justification for restricting split-run editions of U.S.
magazines was premised on its interest in fostering and protecting
a viable Canadian culture. The effect of the Canadian ban was no
doubt protectionist: Canadian periodicals could only survive if
protected from the competition of U.S. magazines (who enjoy
enormous efficiencies of scale). By sheltering Canadians from
Sports Illustrated Canada, Canadian sports fans can read a Cana-
dian publication which gives appropriate coverage to ice hockey
and Canadian football.
The ban on U.S. produced periodicals likely meets the test for
authenticity. Canadians are highly aware of their cultural vulner-
ability, and have a long history of encouraging and protecting
Canadian culture. The Canadian measures are relatively idiosyn-
cratic; other nations have easier times promoting a defining na-
tional culture. English Canada, at least, lacks the linguistic barri-
ers that often operate to segment cultures.
5.4. Consumer Preferences and Japanese Alcoholic Beverages
Japan had maintained an internal taxing scheme which favored
shochu, a traditional spirit, over other spirits, whiskeys and li-
queurs, imported and domestic. In Japanese Alcoholic Beverages,
8 5
the European Communities attacked this practice. Japan argued
that as a matter of trade law it was free to classify goods for excise
tax purposes so long as it respected national treatment; shochu was
something different, and special for the Japanese.
Assume shochu is something different from vodka or other
clear spirits, at least in the minds of the Japanese consumer, even
though this difference might not be discerned by non-Japanese
taste buds or by a chemical analysis. Shochu is also defined
through regulatory differentiation. It is precisely this Japanese
84 See Canada-Certain Measures Concerning Periodicals, Report of the
Appellate Body, June 30, 1997, 1997 WI. 398913; Canada - Certain Measures
Concerning Periodicals, March 14, 1997 (Corrigendum, Mar. 17, 1997), 1997
WL 125665 (GATT).
85 See Japan-Customs Duties, Taxes and Labeling Practices on Imported
Wines and Alcoholic Beverages, Nov. 10, 1987, GATT B.I.S.D. (34th Supp.) at
83.
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
U. Pa. J Int'l Econ. L.
ability to so differentiate, deeply rooted in a cultural context, that
may make this an authentic democratic expression, and so justify
protection.
5.5. Scale Effects and German Beer
In the famous German Beer case, the European Court of Jus-
tice held that Germany could not restrict the use of the product
description Bier exclusively to beverages produced according to
the centuries-old Beer purity law." Rather, beer lawfully pro-
duced in other EU member states must be permitted to be de-
scribed as Bier, even if the non-German beer was produced with
cereals other than malted barley or contained additives. Germany
raised public health and consumer protection justifications for the
application of the Beer purity law to non-German beer which the
Court found unpersuasive.
Article 36 does not permit an exception to the free movement
of goods premised on cultural preservation.17 Nor did the Court
see fit to recognize German national cultural concerns as a manda-
tory requirement under the Cassis de Dijon line of cases which
would justify the maintenance of the German measure. 8 The
case, which established little new law, generated a huge public re-
action in Germany, suggesting serious democratic discontent with
its holding.
The result of the German beer holding is that French, Bel-
gium and Dutch beers could be lawfully imported and sold in
Germany as Bier, even though these beers did not comply with
86 Case 178/84, Commission v. Germany, 1987 E.C.R. 1227.
87 Note that the U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement and subsequently
NAFTA recognize cultural values as grounds for derogation of the free trade
area rules. See North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, art.
2106, Annex 2106, 32 I.L.M. 289 [hereinafter NAFTA]; United States-Canada
Free-Trade Agreement, Dec. 22, 1987-Jan. 2, 1988, U.S.-Can., art. 2005.1, 27
I.L.M. 293 [hereinafter U.S.-Canada Free-Trade Agreement].
88 The European Court of Justice has held that national measures should
not operate to "crystallize given consumer habits" along national lines. Case
170/78, Commission v. United Kingdom, 1983 E.C.R. 2265, 2287 (discussing
the wine and beer excise tax case). This suggests that national cultural values
may be antithetical to the establishment of the common market. But see Case
C-379/87, Groener v. Minister for Education, 1989 E.C.R. 3967. The EU has
taken measures to protection European cultural values, most notoriously in the
Tio6vision sansfronti~re initiative. See Council Directiv6 89/552, 1989 OJ. (L
298) 23.
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the German Beer purity law. Suppose now the following, which
may or may not conform to reality:
1. Traditional German beer is greatly loved by a broad spec-
trum of the public. A stein of traditional German beer costs 2
DM. A small minority of the German public is less discriminat-
ing, and will prefer foreign beer if it is cheaper than 2 DM.
2. Producing traditional German beer is far more expensive
than producing beer using the modern industrial methods permit-
ted in other member states.
3. The production of traditional German beer is scale-
sensitive. That is, the marginal costs of production decline over
the relevant range.
What will be the effect of the entry of the foreign beer occa-
sioned by the lifting of the effective import ban? One can imag-
ine a sequence along the following lines. Foreign beer is intro-
duced and quickly captures the favor of the minority of price-
sensitive (and taste insensitive) consumers. German beer produc-
ers have now lost a portion of their market. Forced to contract
production, the German beer producers now must price their
product at a much higher level, say 3 DM. This in turn may drive
more consumers towards the foreign product. The process re-
peats, with traditional German beer prices rising and market share
declining, until stabilizing eventually with a small cult following
willing to pay perhaps 8 DM for a beer.
Are German consumers overall better off? The economic an-
swer is yes. Is this a democratic resuk? Here the answer is not so
clear. Those price sensitive beer drinkers who first defect to the
foreign beer have clearly been benefited. Cheaper beer which sat-
isfies their demand is now available in the market. But those
German beer loyalist who had been content to pay 2 DM (or
more) for traditional beer, even in face of a cheaper foreign com-
petitive product, and who can no longer find traditional beer at
that price have been harmed. Lifting the import ban effects a
wealth transfer between one group of beer consumers and an-
other.
The implicit internal wealth transfer illustrated by this story
may or may not be democratic. Simple majoritarianism would
permit the greater number of traditional beer drinkers to force
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the price sensitive consumers to pay higher prices (by operation
of the import exclusion) in order to lower the cost of traditional
beer. This may be a democratic result which lifting the import
ban upsets. Of course, the price sensitive beer consumers may be
poorer, and so the implicit wealth transfer may be regressive.
Depending on how social justice notions may or may not be
linked to democracy, the elimination of the import ban may also
be viewed as democratic.
There may be many markets were the enjoyment of a good by
a particular group in society may depend on that good enjoying
an exclusive market. A good with producti6n economies-in-scale,
like German beer, may fit this pattern. Kosher meat may also be
an example; kosher meat may be cheaper if all meat is kosher.
That is, if non-kosher meat enters the market, the price of kosher
meat may rise.89 There are also psychic harm type cases that fit
this model: a Canadian hockey lover may be harmed if other Ca-
nadian sports fans are seduced by Sports Illustrated Canada into
following NCAA football. Given the possibility of deceptive
substitution, an observant Israeli may feel less trusting of the ko-
sher quality of the meat he purchases if non-kosher meat is also
present in the market.
5.6. Political Capture
There is likely a continuum of national measures inconsistent
with trade discipline running from pure "beggar-thy-neighbor-
dom" to pure self-sacrifice. We can expect a large number of cases
where mixed motives are in operation (of authentic and protec-
tionist kinds). In other cases the extent to which a nation impos-
ing a measure bears an important share of its distortion cost is not
so clear.
The national bearing of cost for this purpose, of course, is
measured in gross; within a polity, some discrete interests may
gain even if the measure causes an overall national welfare loss.
Thus, to return again to tuna restrictions, even if it were shown
that overall the United States was engaging in self-sacrifice
(reflected largely in higher tuna prices), this does not necessarily
argue that the trade system should defer on democratic grounds if
the cost burden is a result ofpolitical capture by interests benefiting
8 This may explain the Israeli ban on non-kosher meat.
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from the measure. Indeed, a democratic argument could be ad-
vanced precisely for upsetting the national legislative outcome.
6. COUNTERMANDS AND ANTMAJORITARIANISM
6.1. Democracy, Antimajoritarianism, and Trade
The American democratic experiment, perhaps more so than
continental forms, is premised on a distrust of "factions," whether
of the majority or minority.90 Pure majoritarianism has never
been thought to be per se democratic. 91 We understand that the
operation of politics may permit either majorities or minorities
(of the factional kind) to install legislation. Mere enactment is
only primafacie democratic.
Contemporary political theory has made us aware of how fac-
tions (interest groups) can use superior organization and informa-
tion cost advantages to work their will in legislation. 92 These in-
sights merely confirm a distrust of legislative outcomes as
embodying democratic desires. Alan Sykes and Paul Stephan
have each used public choice theory to account for the enactment
of protectionist laws that favor producers over broader consumer
interests.93 At times, depending on the structure of interests, pro-
tectionist measures can be favored by majorities.
90 This insight originates from the "Madisonian theory of democracy."
ROBERT A. DAHL, A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY 7(1956).
91 Plebiscites are infrequently found in the United States. California is the
most notable exception. A California plebiscite, Proposition 187, limited the
rights of undocumented aliens to draw on social services. The measure was ap-
proved by 59% of Californians voting, but one might argue whether it was
Tdemocratic." See Michael Doyle, Toughest Border Plan Yet, SACRAMNTO BEE,
Mar. 22, 1996, at Al. For an argument that plebiscites have ruined California,
see PETER SCHRAG, PARADISE LOST: CALIFORNIA'S EXPERIENCE, AMERICA'S
FUTURE (1998).
92 See MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIvE ACTION: PUBiC
GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS (1971).
93 See Paul B. Stephan, 'II, Barbarians Inside the Gate: Public Choice Theory
and International Economic Law, 10 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 745 (1995)-;
Alan 0. Sykes, Protectionism as a "Safeguard : A Positive Analysis of the GA 7T
"Escape Clause"with Normative Speculations, 58 U. CH. L. REV. 255 (1991).
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6.2. Trade System Strikes Down National Measure Favored by
Majority
The trade regime can intervene usefully to secure democratic
expression to minorities (or in cases of political capture, majori-
ties). We should not be shy about insisting that nations incorpo-
rate into their regimes, along with market facilitating institutions,
some democratic order. The WTO's indifference as to the demo-
cratic qualifications of its membership should now be rejected.
Opportunities may arise for the world trading community to
promote democracy: analogs to the dismantling of the Jim Crow
South, where the higher (in that case, U.S. federal) authority
trumped locally determined political outcomes (i.e. segregation) in
a pro-democratic manner. This quest, I suppose, is optimistic;
that cases exist where democracy is advanced, and not hindered
by NAFTA, EU, WTO and the like. These would be felicitous
and perhaps quite rare cases where "political failure" has occurred
in national politics, but is corrected, in some sense, by the inter-
national trade regime. The international trade regime may create
"rights" (a new legal heritage, in the EU sense) or at least expecta-
tions that may be invoked by nationals against their respective
states.
NAFTA may present such an opportunity. Currently the
Labor Side Agreement merely requires Mexico to enforce its ex-
isting labor code.9 4  But norms may develop under the side
agreement or under NAFTA itself to require significant labor re-
form.9" This in turn may contribute to the progress of meaning-
ful democratic progress in Mexico. Similarly, environmental
NGOs in Mexico and in the United States have used NAFTA's
enforcement provisions to obtain compliance with national
norms. Again, I hesitate to resemble an apologist, but the de-
mocracy question, at least with respect to NAFTA, is not entirely
hopeless.
94 See North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation, openedfor signa-
ture Sept. 9, 1993, art. 2, 32 I.L.M. 1499, 1503.
95 I do not suggest that NAFTA will compel Mexico to harmonize or oth-
erwise bring its labor standards "up" or "down" to U.S. or Canadian levels. See
Atik, supra note 56, at 93-97.
96 See id
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6.3. Trade System Imposes Measure Favored by Minority
In a greater number of instances, the international trade disci-
plines are affirmatively requiring national enactment. This has
advanced farthest in Europe (principally through the directive)
but can also be seen in NAFTA and the WTO agreements.
TRIPS, for example, requires WTO member to adopt intellectual
property regimes that may not otherwise command majority
support within national legislatures. 97  To the extent these re-
quirements have effect, they do so in opposition of expected ma-
joritarian outcomes. To stand, we might require a heightened
showing of democratic legitimacy, either through identifying an
offsetting gain as part of a larger bargain or by identifying a mi-
noritarian expectation that can be appropriately cloaked by
democratic values.
Enforcement disciplines may be an additional form of antima-
joritarianism. NAFTA, for example, requires its parties to en-
force their respective laws on labor, the environment and intellec-
tual property. 8 To a certain extent, NGOs can invoke NAFTA
to compel compliance within their respective countries.99 Thus,
minorities who have secured favorable legislative outcomes can
receive additional, external protection in cases of administrative
non-enforcement by succeeding majority governments.
7. CONCLUSION
An examination of specific dispute phenomena may test no-
tions about democracy and the legitimacy of the international
economic order that a more general critique fails to capture. This
essay addresses these more limited critiques, aimed at specific dis-
pute resolution outcomes. I am interested throughout in identify-
ing cases where the international trade regime is invoked by inter-
est groups who have been shut out of local/domestic politics, or
at least have failed to achieve their political ends.
We then might apply a useful screen to instances where de-
mocracy is invoked to question the appropriateness, if not the le-
97 See supra note 2.
98 See NAFTA, supra note 87, art. 1601 (labor provisions), art. 904
(environmental provisions), art. 1701(1) (intellectual property provisions);
Retreatfrom Harmonization, supra note 56, at 97-99.
99 See North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation,
opened for signature Sept. 9, 1993, art. 14, 32 I.L.M. 1480, 1488.
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gitimacy, of an international trade dispute outcome. First we
might ask if the national measure enjoyed the clear support of its
population: a widely endorsed measure should receive greater re-
spect. If this is so, we might ask if the nation imposing the meas-
ure has meaningfully borne a share of the distortion costs im-
posed on the system. If, on the other hand, we look through and
cannot see a compelling instance of democratic expression, or if
there is patent externalization present, then application of trade
discipline seems even more appropriate. And finally, if we see
cases where democracy has been disregarded, the trade system
might usefully exert its hierarchical position to exact progressive
change.
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